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A B S T R A C T
Valuation that focuses only on individual values evades the substantial collective and intersubjective meanings,
signiﬁcance and value from ecosystems. Shared, plural and cultural values of ecosystems constitute a diﬀuse and
interdisciplinary ﬁeld of research, covering an area that links questions around value ontology, elicitation and
aggregation with questions of participation, ethics, and social justice. Synthesising understanding from various
contributions to this Special Issue of Ecosystem Services, and with a particular focus on deliberation and
deliberative valuation, we discuss key ﬁndings and present 35 future research questions in eight topic areas: 1)
the ontology of shared values; 2) the role of catalyst and conﬂict points; 3) shared values and cultural ecosystem
services; 4) transcendental values; 5) the process and outcomes of deliberation; 6) deliberative monetary
valuation; 7) value aggregation, meta-values and ‘rules of the game’; and 8) integrating valuation methods. The
results of this Special Issue and these key questions can help develop a more extensive evidence base to mature
the area and develop environmental valuation into a more pluralistic, comprehensive, robust, legitimate and
eﬀective way of safeguarding ecosystems and their services for the future.
1. Introduction
Shared values are values that convey conceptions of the common
good between people and are formed, expressed and assigned through
social interactions. The term shared values, and related terms such as
social values, shared social values, (socio)cultural values and plural
values, have been used to indicate a variety of concepts that relate to a
sense of importance transcending individual utility, and that express
the multidimensionality of values (Kenter et al., 2015; 2014a, 2014b).
Valuation that focuses only on individual values evades the substantial
collective and intersubjective meanings, signiﬁcance and value from
ecosystems, while deliberation on shared values can help make
valuation more robust and enhance its legitimacy (Farber et al.,
2002; Fish et al., 2011a; O’Neill, 2007; Kenter et al., 2016b, in this
issue). This is important because valuations that overlook these wider
meanings may undermine the legitimacy of decisions based upon them.
Indeed, in this journal some have argued that ‘truly social valuation’ of
public policy alternatives is the ‘next frontier’ in environmental
valuation, and that developing eﬀective and credible techniques to
achieve this is the greatest challenge facing ecological and environ-
mental economics today (Parks and Gowdy, 2013).
Shared values particularly come into play in determining how we
evaluate values across the plural ontological and ethical dimensions of
value (Kenter, 2016b, in this issue; Kenter et al., 2015; Lo, 2011;
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O’Neill et al., 2008; Sagoﬀ, 1998). This Special Issue illustrates in
diverse ways that the ethical, moral and justice dimensions of many
environmental issues necessitate approaches that allow for the recog-
nition and elicitation of shared, plural and cultural values (Irvine et al.,
2016; Cooper et al., 2016; Everard et al., 2016; Raymond and Kenter,
2016; Edwards et al., 2016; Kenter, 2016b, 2016c; Kenter et al., 2016b;
Orchard-Webb et al., 2016; Ranger et al., 2016). Key ethical concerns
include: providing a space and opportunity for people to identify values
that they may ﬁnd diﬃcult to articulate (e.g. spiritual, identity);
recognising that some values cannot be traded without discussion
and negotiation (e.g. the legal or felt rights of local people, intrinsic
values of other species); and understanding that it is often diﬃcult to
isolate valuation from decision-making processes because people feel
there are strong ethical or moral issues at stake that need to be debated
(e.g. the justice of the process, fairness in the distribution of beneﬁts or
disbeneﬁts, responsibility, and issues of sustainability and future
generations).
This reﬂects dominant themes in environmental debates, which
often revolve around a number of key issues, including: lack of trust in
elected representatives (Gastil, 2002; Independent Panel on Forestry,
2011), feelings of powerlessness in the face of globalization (Kiely,
2004), the ethical and social impacts of an increase in certain aspects of
technology (Everard et al., 2016, in this issue), and a call for justice and
equity in environmental decision-making (Economic and Social
Research Council, 2000). While our focus is on the environment, many
of the questions discussed here are also increasingly pertinent in other
areas of public policy and evaluation. For example, in health valuation,
contestation of instrumental, eﬃciency-based methods of health ser-
vices valuation and allocation have given rise to nascent ‘communitar-
ian’ approaches to health, drawing on deliberation of communal values
(Cleary et al., 2011; Mooney et al., 2002).
Nonetheless, shared values have been under-investigated, leading
to a lack of established conceptual and evaluative frameworks to guide
their assessment (Bunse et al., 2015; Ives and Kendal, 2014; Kenter,
2016a; Kenter et al., 2015; Parks and Gowdy, 2013; Raymond et al.,
2014; Irvine et al., 2016, in this issue; Scholte et al., 2015). This Special
Issue of Ecosystem Services addresses a breadth of topics associated
with shared values and illustrates a wide range of methods for
understanding and assessing them. This paper synthesises current
understandings and provides future directions for research around
shared values, and the role of deliberation in valuation processes,
which is highlighted in this issue as a key way in which shared values
can be formed and expressed.
Deliberation has been proposed both as an answer to methodolo-
gical problems within monetary (and to a lesser degree non-monetary)
valuation (Alvarez Farizo and Hanley, 2006; Alvarez Farizo et al., 2007;
Bunse et al., 2015; Lienhoop and Hanley, 2006; Lienhoop and
MacMillan, 2007; Raymond et al., 2014; Szabó, 2011; Urama and
Hodge, 2006), as a means to bring in questions of fairness, justice and
participation (O’Neill et al., 2008; Spash, 2008; Zografos and Howarth,
2010), and as an answer to theoretical critiques of economic appraisal
that are based on assumptions of individual, commensurable, and
consequentialist values (Hockley, 2014; Howarth and Wilson, 2006;
Kenter, 2016a; Kenter, 2017; Irvine et al., 2016, in this issue; O’Neill,
2007, 1996; Sagoﬀ, 1998). While deliberative processes take place
formally and informally, and individually and socially, we focus here on
group-based deliberative processes that involve reﬂecting on and
discussing values and information to form reasoned opinions (Kenter
et al., 2016a). Group deliberation has been an important element in all
the methodological approaches in the empirical studies in this Special
Issue, and can be considered central to shared values approaches to
valuing ecosystem services.
Although the terms shared, plural, social and cultural values may
each emphasise somewhat diﬀerent aspects of values (for an overview
of terms see Kenter et al., 2015), for the sake of brevity we summarily
refer to shared values or a shared values approach. A shared values
approach can be deﬁned as an approach that recognises a plurality of
values (ontologically, ethically, epistemologically) that are socially
formed, both substantively and procedurally. In the introduction to
this Special Issue of Ecosystem Services, Kenter (2016b) highlights six
features of such an approach, which are reﬂected across the diverse
papers in the issue: 1) axiological plurality; 2) the need for deliberation
on these plural values to establish the common good; 3) the importance
of institutional factors, such as the role of power, in such processes of
value elicitation-formation; 4) the need to recognise and interpret
cultural and institutional histories, place, identity and experience to
understand values and contexts; 5) the inevitable subjectivity of
valuations that arises from the complexity and contestedness of many
environmental issues, because no valuation is ‘complete’ in its ability to
encompass every aspect and dimension of value; and 6) the potential of
valuations as new democratic spaces, bridging the divide between
research and practice.
The Special Issue that this paper concludes originated in two work
packages (Church et al., 2014: ‘Cultural Ecosystem Services’; and
Kenter et al., 2014b: ‘Shared, Plural and Cultural Values’) of the UK
National Ecosystem Assessment Follow-On (UK NEA, 2014), a sub-
stantial research programme that aimed to address key areas identiﬁed
by the UK NEA (2011) as priorities for further development. After
completion of the programme, a two-day workshop with UK NEA
Follow-On co-investigators and authors across the papers in this
Special Issue was held in March 2015 to sketch out future directions
for research around shared values. Each participant initially presented
their individual perspective, followed by open group deliberation and
facilitated brainstorming and reﬂection exercises. This resulted in a
gross list of research questions that was then distilled and reﬁned to 35
questions across eight topic areas (Table 1) through online discussion.
These areas are: 1) the ontology of shared values; 2) the role of catalyst
and conﬂict points; 3) shared values and cultural ecosystem services; 4)
transcendental values; 5) the process and outcomes of deliberation; 6)
deliberative monetary valuation (DMV); 7) value aggregation, meta-
values and ‘rules of the game’; 8) integrating valuation methods. The
next section synthesises the outcomes of the workhop discussions with
key material from papers across the Special Issue. We end with ﬁnal
reﬂections and conclusions.
2. Key ﬁndings and future directions
2.1. Ontology of shared, plural and cultural values
Reviews by Kenter et al. (2014b) and Irvine et al. (2016, in this
issue) demonstrate the wide variety of ways in which the fuzzy and
overlapping terms ‘shared’, ‘social’, ‘plural’ and ‘cultural’ values have
been used in the ecosystem services valuation and ecosystems manage-
ment literature. To provide clarity in identiﬁcation and assessment,
Kenter et al. (2015) discriminated ﬁve dimensions of values: (i) the
value concept; (ii) the value provider; (iii) the process used to elicit
values; (iv) the scale of value; and (v) its intention (Fig. 1). The value
concept dimension distinguishes transcendental values (our context-
transcending principles and life goals), from contextual values and
value indicators. Value providers include individuals, ad hoc groups
(e.g. in deliberative valuation), communities, societies and cultures,
providing individual, group, communal, societal and cultural values.
Values may be deliberated or not, depending on the process of
elicitation. The scale dimension discriminates whether values relate
to individuals (e.g. individual willingness to pay [WTP]) or a societal
scale (e.g. social willingness to pay), and the intention dimension
diﬀerentiates self- from other-regarding values. The authors then
identify seven main, non-mutually exclusive types of shared/social
values, listed in Table 2: 1) transcendental values; 2) cultural and
societal values; 3) communal values; 4) group values; 5) deliberated
values; 6) other-regarding values; and 7) value to society. Shared
values are then conceived of as ontologically plural in the sense of
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Table 1
Key topics and questions for future research on shared values and deliberation.
Topic area Key questions
Ontology of shared, plural
and cultural values
1 Do people (1) hold a single set of values that
can only be approximated through elicitation;
(2) hold multiple sets of values activated by
different roles, contexts, and value-eliciting
institutions; (3) hold partially formed ‘proto-
values’ that are adapted to contexts; or (4) not
hold a priori values at all but only form them
through expression?
2 What are the conceptual and empirical
relations between different types of shared
values and ethical perspectives, e.g. between
other-regarding values and non-
consequentialist values?
Catalyst and conﬂict points
and deliberative
valuations as new
democratic spaces
3 Can deliberative methods integrate fairness
and justice concerns to the degree that they
lead to decisions that are seen as legitimate by
all those parties involved in catalyst or conflict
points?
4 Can shared values approaches give more voice
and agency to those often excluded from
decision-making processes?
5 By functioning as boundary objects between
research, policy and practice, can shared values
approaches lead to more effective translation of
values into decisions, and what optimises their
transformative potential as new democratic
spaces?
6 How might social media be utilised as online
new democratic spaces to effectively engage a
wider group of publics and stakeholders in
deliberative valuations, and what guidelines
and protocols are necessary for the legitimacy
of such spaces?
Shared values and cultural
ecosystem services
7 How do different non-monetary methods used
to value cultural ecosystem services compare in
terms of their ontology, epistemology and
axiology?
8 How should ‘two-way relationships’ between
people and the environment be valued and
incorporated into decisions?
9 What models for deliberation are used in social
and cultural institutions such as faith
communities to incorporate shared values into
their decision-making that could be adapted for
use in environmental decision-making?
Transcendental values 10 Which categories of transcendental values are
most pertinent to ecosystem service valuation,
management and conservation?
11 How do transcendental values affect contextual
values and value indicators?
12 What role do different types of transcendental
values play in deliberative processes, and how
are they affected by deliberation?
13 How do transcendental values of individuals
relate to the shared values of groups in which
inviduals self-reference, and what role do these
hierarchical interactions have on contextual
value and environmental behaviour formation
and change?
The process and outcomes of
deliberation
14 What is the relative impact of different key
factors (e.g. ability to deliberate, power
dynamics, institutional factors – see Fig. 2) on
deliberation and value outcomes in processes
of value formation, and what indicators can be
used?
15 What are the relative impacts of different types
of deliberation and deliberative exercises and
interventions on individual and group values?
16 What is the relation between value formation
and value change, at the individual level and in
(continued on next page)
Table 1 (continued)
Topic area Key questions
groups in terms of convergence or divergence?
17 How does deliberation in valuation compare to
deliberation in other institutional processes?
18 Are the effects of long-term and repeated
deliberation demonstrably different from one-
off deliberative interventions, and how does
long-term/repeated deliberation affect
different types of shared values?
Deliberative monetary
valuation
19 Do deliberated group values or deliberated
individual values offer more robust indicators
of welfare impacts than non-deliberated
individual values?
20 Can deliberation reduce hypothetical bias?
21 What criteria should be used for validity and
legitimacy of deliberated values?
22 How should deliberated individual and social
willingness to pay and fair prices be used in
appraisal?
23 Do deliberated values elicited in valuation
workshops endure over time?
24 What methodological innovations are needed
to address persistent issues of democratic
legitimacy in deliberative valuation?
25 What protocols, grounded in deliberative
democracy theory, can be devised in terms of
stakeholder/participant representation,
process design and facilitation to deal with
explicit and implicit power dynamics in
deliberative valuation?
26 Can democratic deliberative monetary
valuation approaches adequately address non-
consequentialist values, including intrinsic
values of nature?
Value aggregation, meta-
values and ‘rules of the
game’
27 How can democratic deliberation be used for
aggregation and negotiation of values at the
large-scale?
28 What are people's transcendental values
around value-aggregation (meta-values)? How
fundamental and universal are they? Do they
differ across contexts and cultures?
29 How do people's transcendental values around
value-aggregation (meta-values) compare to
the meta-values used in different institutions?
30 How does the use of different value-
aggregation rules affect the outcomes of
appraisal?
31 What procedures are there or can be developed
for deliberating on meta-values around value
aggregation rules, and how robust are these
from a democratic perspective? To what degree
can these be transferred between different
contexts?
Integrating valuation
methods
32 Can epistemological and axiological differences
between instrumental and deliberative
methods be bridged to take advantage of the
strengths of both?
33 How can we ensure plural value dimensions
are fully recognised without reverting to
separate knowledge domains?
34 How and to what extent does the use of
different valuation methods privilege the
values of some social or cultural groups while
discounting or undermining the values of
others?
35 Can we define integrated methodologies that
situate local or marginalised values and
knowledges in such a way that they can be fully
articulated, but which can also be taken
forward as evidence for broader decision-
making processes?
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varying across the above dimensions and in that they may reﬂect
diﬀerent categories such as utility, rights, virtues and aesthetic values,
and are thus potentially incommensurable.
This discussion raises the question of how these diﬀerent dimen-
sions and types of values interact with each other. For example, many
papers in this issue, and in the literature where conventional valuation
approaches are critiqued, explicitly or implicitly make strong links
between other-regarding values, non-individual (i.e. group/communal/
societal/cultural) values and non-consequentialist values. Is this just an
artefact of mirroring the neoclassical economic association between
individualism, selﬁshness and utilitarianism, or do we indeed hold a
distinct set of other-regarding, moralistic, shared, ‘citizen’ values
(Sagoﬀ, 1998) in parallel with a set of selﬁsh utilitarian ‘consumer’
values?
This leads to more fundamental questions on the nature of values
and why diﬀerent valuation approaches lead to diﬀerent value expres-
sions. Do we hold (1) a single set of values that can only be
approximated through elicitation, as is assumed by neoclassical
economics, but also implicitly by many non-monetary valuation
approaches (Raymond et al., 2014); (2) multiple sets of values
activated by diﬀerent roles, contexts, and value-eliciting institutions
(Sagoﬀ, 1998; Vatn, 2009); (3) partially formed ‘proto-values’ that are
adapted to contexts; or (4) not hold a priori values but form them
through social interaction and expression (Irvine et al., 2016, in this
issue; Kenter et al., 2016a, in this issue)?
This question is most salient for contextual values and their
indicators, as transcendental values are generally assumed to be
culturally engrained during childhood and stable across our lifespan
(Schwartz, 1992; 1994; Manfredo et al., 2014). Nonetheless transcen-
dental values can change when speciﬁcally challenged (Bardi and
Goodwin, 2011), and several deliberative valuation studies in this
issue (Kenter, 2016c; Kenter et al., 2016b; Raymond and Kenter, 2016)
demonstrated changes not just in WTP following deliberation, but also
in the relative importance of diﬀerent transcendental values, which
again beckons the question if this constitutes value change, value
formation or a shift to a diﬀerent value set activated by the context.
2.2. The role of catalyst and conﬂict points
Catalyst and/or conﬂict points can play a key role in both the
emergence and articulation of values at a societal or community level
that have not previously been expressed or articulated (Irvine et al.,
2016, in this issue; Everard et al., 2016, in this issue; Edwards et al.,
2016, in this issue). They are often linked to wider contested issues and
meanings about who is involved in decision-making, whose voice
counts and is viewed as legitimate and who receives the beneﬁts or
disbeneﬁts of any environmental change. A key issue of many conﬂicts
are the emotional responses that arise from individuals and commu-
nities. In psychology emotions are often seen as automatic reactions
that can occur when individuals encounter signiﬁcant issues with
others or their environment, while in sociology emotions are explicitly
linked to cognition and values, with a focus on the social origin and
function of emotions (Buijs and Lawrence, 2013). Buijs and Lawrence
(2013) argue that tendencies to rationalise nature often leave little
room for emotion and can delegitimise it. Decision makers may dismiss
emotions and feelings related to conﬂicts as irrational and not based on
evidence and therefore focus on providing greater amounts of factual
information. Terms such as NIMBYism (not in my back yard) can also
be used to dismiss community concerns as irrelevant, ill-informed and
not legitimate (Burningham, 1995). Emotional attachments to nature
should be taken into account in valuations and management of
ecosystems with managers playing a greater role in acknowledging
Elicitation process
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Value
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values
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Societal & cultural 
values
Communal 
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Individual 
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Fig. 1. Shared values framework: the ﬁve dimensions and seven main types of shared
and social values (Source: Kenter et al., 2015). Bold titles indicate non-mutually exclusive
dimensions of value. Emerging from the dimensions, we can diﬀerentiate between types
of values that might be termed shared, social, or shared social values (italicised), and
other types of values. For example, provider is a dimension that indicates who might
provide values in a valuation setting; societies, cultures, communities and ad-hoc groups
provide societal, cultural, communal and group values, which are all types of shared or
social values. Individuals also provide values, but these are not termed shared or social,
unless they can be classiﬁed as such on a dimension other than that of value-provider.
Arrows within boxes indicate directions of inﬂuence between diﬀerent types of values.
Grey arrows signify that the type of elicitation process and value provider strongly
inﬂuence what value types are articulated along the concept, intention and scale
dimensions.
Table 2
Main types of shared and social values with definitions and dimensions along which they
can be discriminated (Source: Kenter et al., 2015).
Type of shared/
social value
Deﬁnition Associated
dimension
Transcendental
values
Conceptions about desirable end states
or behaviours that transcend specific
situations and guide selection or
evaluation of behaviour and events
(after Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987).
Concept
Cultural and societal
values
Culturally shared principles and virtues
as well as a shared sense of what is
worthwhile and meaningful. Cultural
values are grounded in the cultural
heritage and practices of a society and
pervasively reside within societal
institutions. Societal values are the
cultural values of a society; societies
may be more or less homogenous, so
there may be multiple sets of cultural
values in one society that overlap to a
greater or lesser degree with each other.
Provider
Communal values Values held in common by members of
community (e.g. geographic, faith/
belief-based, community of practice or
interest), including shared principles
and virtues as well as a shared sense of
what is worthwhile and meaningful.
Provider
Group values
(within
valuation)
Values expressed by a group as a whole
(e.g. through consensus and negotiation
or voting, or more informally), in some
kind of valuation setting.
Provider
Deliberated values Value outcomes of a deliberative
process; typically, but not necessarily, a
deliberative group process that involves
discussion and learning.
Process
Other-regarding
values
As contextual values: the sense of
importance attached to the well-being of
others (human or non-human). As
transcendental values: regard for the
moral standing of others.
Intention
Value to society Benefit, worth or importance to society
as a whole.
Scale
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and discussing emotions and learning how to deal with them con-
structively.
Underlying positive and negative emotional responses to environ-
mental issues are often transcendental values. In particular, transcen-
dental values related to broad issues of justice, ethics, fairness and
responsibility tend to emerge in response to conﬂict points and there is
often a distributive dimension concerning who is aﬀected and in what
way, with the poor and powerless potentially not being heard and taken
into account (O’Neill et al., 2008). Catalyst points can also bring
strongly held contextual values to the fore. For example, in response to
the proposed public forest estate privatisation in England, 2011,
publics identiﬁed particular woodlands that held speciﬁc meanings
(often based on emotional attachment) for them and were valued as
special places, such as the woods where they had climbed trees, played
hide and seek, and built dens as children (Kenter et al., 2015).
By recognising and making explicit transcendental, societal and
communal values while simultaneously addressing obstacles associated
with power dynamics through well-designed deliberation, we can bring
more understanding to what we share and what diﬀerentiates and
divides us (e.g. Ranger et al., 2016, in this issue), and it may be possible
to arrive at a more widely accepted consensus or compromise (e.g.
Orchard-Webb et al., 2016, in this issue). As discussed above,
deliberative approaches may also allow shifts from an individual to a
societal stance of an issue, which can help identify common ground and
reduce the polarisation of views that often characterises conﬂict
situations. Irvine et al. (2016, in this issue) discuss the potential of
deliberative valuations as new democratic spaces and Kenter (2016b, in
this issue) adds that such valuations can function as boundary objects
between researchers, stakeholders and decision makers. Ranger et al.
(2016); Edwards et al. (2016); Kenter (2016c) and Orchard-Webb et al.
(2016), all in this issue, demonstrate examples of this in practice in
diﬀerent marine and terrestrial contexts, where environmental man-
agers or decision makers are directly involved in valuation and
evaluation processes, enabling more eﬀective translation of values into
policy and practice. From this perspective, the aim of integrating
deliberation into valuation is not just more robust value elicitation, but
to provide more eﬀective opportunities for diverse voices to be
recognised in decisions, and to build bridges between potentially
conﬂicting perspectives and interests in the process of shared value
formation.
Social media are increasingly being used in relation to conﬂict and
catalyst points, providing opportunities to mobilise and raise the proﬁle
of any conﬂict as well as coordinate activities of diverse groups of
people across wide geographical areas. In the public forest estate
privatisation example, the use of social media was critical is raising
awareness about the proposed ‘sell oﬀ’ and galvanising protest that led
to the government cancelling the public consultation (Kenter et al.,
2015). The role of social media in catalyst and conﬂict situations is
likely to increase, and it could potentially be utilised to engage a wider
group of publics and stakeholders in debates around shared values, or
as a vector for deliberative valuations.
2.3. Shared values and cultural ecosystem services
While shared values approaches are not limited to cultural ecosys-
tem services, these services raise particular axiological and ontological
issues that favour approaches involving deliberative and non-monetary
valuation. Many aspects of cultural ecosystem services resist classiﬁca-
tion as a ‘service’ or ‘beneﬁt’ because they can be intangible, experi-
ential, identity-based or idiosyncratic. While others have raised these
points (Chan et al., 2012b, 2016; Church et al., 2014; Daniel et al.,
2012; Kenter et al., 2011; Milcu et al., 2013; Pleasant et al., 2014),
Cooper et al. (2016, in this issue) develop these arguments speciﬁcally
in relation to spiritual and aesthetic values of ecosystems, ﬁnding that
such values are often intersubjective and non-consequentialist, and
reﬂect a two-way relationship between people and nature. While they
beneﬁt human well-being, spiritual and aesthetic values of ecosystems
should not primarily be classiﬁed as ‘services’ or ‘beneﬁts’. Indeed, the
primary value direction may be from humans to the rest of nature
(‘ecosystems’) as duties owed. These arise from the very diﬀerent
conceptions of nature in aesthetic and spiritual discourses to that of
ecosystems delivering services.
Cooper and colleagues argue that aesthetic judgements of value
have been distinguished from personal tastes and pleasures since the
Enlightenment. Aesthetic value is tied to the actual objects and their
compositional relationships and not in the happenstance of how much
pleasure an observer receives on a particular day. Brady (2003) points
out that aesthetic judgements of nature are intersubjective, established
through the identiﬁcation of aesthetic qualities and agreements that
emerge through social processes or, for example, meeting the test of
time. These value judgements can motivate a moral responsibility to
maintain the beauty of speciﬁc places and the wider world, ‘aesthetic
preservationism’, expressed in protective designations such as National
Parks.
Many spiritual discourses about nature also resist talk of conse-
quentialist beneﬁts and economic analysis. These discourses counter
assertions that the world has been successfully disenchanted by the
commodiﬁcation of nature. For example, in a study in this issue on the
values associated with marine sites under consideration as potential
marine protected areas (MPAs) by Kenter et al. (2016b), divers and
anglers portrayed profound experiences of beauty, fascination, magic,
and connectedness that provided a deep layer of meaning to the places
they visited that would have been invisible if the study had only focused
on monetary outcomes. For example, one diver noted, “I ticked all of
these [values] and more, I added religious which is strange really
because I am an atheist. I was in one place and visibility opened up
and it was like a cathedral, with jewel anemones lighting up every-
where. I felt like I was in the presence of God, if there is such a thing. I
was crying when I came out of the water”.
Considering the importance of shared values for cultural ecosystem
services more broadly, Fish et al. (2016a, in this issue) in their novel
cultural services framework highlight the important role that shared
cultural values play in terms of inﬂuencing how spaces are perceived,
what practices are undertaken in those spaces, and how spaces and
practices interact in shaping identities, forming capabilities and gen-
erating experiences. The authors emphasise that these cultural values
and interactions are not abstract but are expressed as life in situ.
Understanding cultural services thus means understanding peoples’
modalities of living that form and reﬂect the values and histories that
people share, the places they inhabit and their symbolic and material
practices. Importantly, shared cultural values are thus not wholly
intangible as they are directly conveyed in material culture
(Satterﬁeld et al., 2013; Fish et al., 2016a, in this issue). While it has
previously been (rightly) argued that monetary valuations are chal-
lenged by intangible cultural values, in contrast Kenter (2016c, in this
issue) and Fish et al. (2016b, in this issue) note that monetary
valuation techniques such as choice experiments, deliberative or not,
on their own are typically too abstract to adequately recognise cultural
materialities. Fish et al. (2016a; 2016b) thus emphasise the need for
interpretive and interpretive-deliberative approaches to investigate
these modalities; examples in this issue include storytelling (Kenter
et al., 2016b; Orchard-Webb et al., 2016), arts-led dialogue (Edwards
et al., 2016), ethnographic video interviews feeding into deliberative
workshops (Ranger et al., 2016), and participatory mapping (Kenter,
2016c; Fish et al., 2016b).
However, these diﬀerent types of non-monetary valuation methods
have diﬀerent ontological, axiological and epistemological assump-
tions, and thus the method chosen will inﬂuence how and which values
are conveyed, beckoning the need for comparisons between valuations
and whether and how those diﬀerences might aﬀect decisions informed
by those valuations. Cooper et al. (2016 this issue) note how some faith
communities incorporate shared values into their own decision-making
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thus providing models that could be adapted for use in environmental
decision-making.
2.4. Valuation and transcendental values
The role of transcendental values is an important but understudied
area of research in relation to monetary and non-monetary valuation of
ecosystem services. Raymond and Kenter (2016, in this issue) showed
that transcendental values directly inﬂuence WTP and behavioural
intentions, as well as indirectly via worldviews, beliefs, norms and
environmental concerns. Case studies across this Special Issue (Kenter
et al., 2016b; Kenter, 2016c; Orchard-Webb et al., 2016; Raymond and
Kenter, 2016); demonstrated how diﬀerent psychometric approaches
(including scales presented in survey instruments and a form of
‘participatory psychometrics’ adapted for use in a group setting),
and deliberative and qualitative approaches such as storytelling were
harnessed and in some cases integrated to help elicit and understand
transcendental values in relation to ecosystem services.
Beyond this issue, there has been very little research demonstrating
and investigating the role of transcendental values in ecosystem service
valuation, and more broadly environmental management and decision-
making, with few links between the environmental psychology and
ecosystem services literature (Hicks et al., 2015; Raymond and Kenter,
2016, in this issue), though there has been more attention to
transcendental values in conservation research (Dietsch et al., 2016;
Manfredo et al., 2016). More research is needed to better understand
the eﬀects of transcendental values on contextual values, value
indicators (e.g. WTP) and behaviour, and the role of transcendental
values in deliberation. This is likely to involve integrating elements of
diﬀerent psychological theories such as the Value Belief Norm theory,
the Theory of Planned Behaviour and the Value Change Model
(Raymond and Brown, 2011; Kenter et al., 2016a, in this issue;
Everard et al., 2016, in this issue), and considering the interactions
between individual and group psychological processes and the social-
ecological context in which these processes are situated, e.g. through
multi-level models that concurrently examine the interactions among
individual and group psychological processes and the environmental
context (Manfredo et al., 2014).
However, psychological approaches have focused on subsets of
transcendental values (primarily biospheric, altruistic and egoistic
values), leaving out other transcendental values pertinent to ecosystem
management, in particular those that are procedurally important, e.g.
around responsibility, fairness, justice and participation. Such process-
related values are likely to impact on how people perceive and frame
ecosystem service valuation (O’Neill, 2007) and are particularly
important when considering issues around intergenerational equity
and regard for non-human species (Irvine et al., 2016, in this issue). As
will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.6.1, deliberative demo-
cratic valuations can address these process values explicitly (Kenter,
2017; Orchard-Webb et al., 2016, in this issue), but as of yet their role
in deliberation and valuation is poorly understood. Conversely, delib-
erative valuation processes also provide opportunities for exploring
interactions between transcendental and contextual values of indivi-
duals and the group, and the psychological processes responsible for
changes in values.
The work on transcendental values in this issue ultimately high-
lights that ecosystem managers cannot just focus policy instruments on
monetary drivers of change (Raymond and Kenter, 2016, in this issue).
Any change of behaviour wrought by a scheme will be short term unless
policy instruments target the underlying antecedents of that behaviour
(Cromton, 2010). Ultimately, broader shifts in environmental attitudes
and behaviour have been the result of shifts in transcendental values at
the societal and cultural level (Everard et al., 2016, in this issue).
Changes in contextual values and behaviour, resulting from activation
of particular transcendental values through short term interventions
such as one-oﬀ deliberative exercises, are not likely to endure with
individuals unless these are reﬂected in their social environment
through social learning processes (Bardi and Goodwin, 2011; Kenter
et al., 2016a, in this issue). However, changes in contextual values and
behaviour in relation to the environment can also take place through a
variety of other ways than through changes in transcendental values,
such as through changes in perceived beneﬁts and costs, perceived
behavioural control and symbolic and aﬀective motivations, in turn
interacting with broader cultural, geographic and contextual factors
(Steg and Vlek, 2009; Dietsch et al., 2016). This highlights the need for
research taking an integrated perspective on environmental motiva-
tion, value and behaviour formation and change, accounting for the
direct and indirect eﬀects of transcendental values and the role of
aﬀective and hedonic motivations and contextual factors, as well as
how these play out in interactions between individuals and group. In
this way, environmental policies can be targeted at multiple motiva-
tions and at diﬀerent scales (individuals, social groups and commu-
nities, societies as a whole) to be eﬀective.
2.5. The process and outcomes of deliberation
As noted above, most papers in this issue have illustrated that the
ethical, moral and justice dimensions of many environmental issues
necessitate approaches that allow for the recognition and elicitation of
shared, plural and cultural values (Cooper et al., 2016; Edwards et al.,
2016; Everard et al., 2016; Irvine et al., 2016; Kenter, 2016a, 2016b;
Kenter et al., 2016b; Orchard-Webb et al., 2016; Raymond and Kenter,
2016; Ranger et al., 2016). Deliberation thus becomes critical for many
environmental questions, to allow for discussion and debate about
fairness, equity and justice issues concerning shared, plural and
cultural values, to recognise that some values cannot be traded oﬀ
and that valuations cannot be abstracted from decision-making con-
texts, and to provide space for articulation of complex, subtle and
implicit values and value formation more broadly.
Kenter et al. (2016a) describe that a deliberative process can
include the following elements:
1. the search for, acquisition of, and social exchange of information,
gaining knowledge (by learning about the information acquired),
and the expression and exchange of transcendental values and
beliefs, to form reasoned opinions;
2. the expression of reasoned opinions (rather than exerting power or
coercion), as part of dialogic and civil engagement between partici-
pants, respecting diﬀerent views held by participants, being able to
openly express disagreement, providing equal opportunity for all
participants to engage in deliberation, and providing opportunities
for participants to evaluate and re-evaluate their positions;
3. identiﬁcation and critical evaluation of options or ‘solutions’ that
might address a problem, reﬂecting on potential consequences and
trade-oﬀs associated with diﬀerent options; and
4. integration of insights from the deliberative process to establish
contextual values around diﬀerent options, and determining a
preferred option, which is well informed and reasoned.
As a democratic ideal, deliberation is a reﬂexive process in which
participants not only discuss information (thus far the main focus of
deliberative monetary valuation [DMV] approaches; Bunse et al.,
2015), but also set the terms of the discussion, debate how questions
should be framed and what types of values should be considered
(Orchard-Webb et al., 2016, in this issue). They can discuss how values
should be weighted and what rights and duties to take into account,
including issues surrounding long-term sustainability (Farber et al.,
2002). Participants can also discuss and reﬂect upon how the outcome
of their deliberations should be used.
Kenter et al., (2016a) argue that the process of value formation in
deliberation is intrinsically a social learning process, which they deﬁne
as a change in understanding that goes beyond the individual to
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become situated within wider social units or communities of practice
through social interactions between actors within social networks (after
Reed et al., 2010). It is this social mediation of learning that explains
why some deliberative processes achieve their goals while others fail,
for example if the power dynamics of the social context are not
eﬀectively facilitated, leading to a biasing of outcomes towards the
positions of dominant individuals or groups. The Deliberative Value
Formation model identiﬁes key factors that inﬂuence potential out-
comes of deliberation (Fig. 2) and conceptualises the social process as
feeding into a translation of transcendental values to a speciﬁc context.
However, indicators need to be identiﬁed or developed for diﬀerent
stages of this process, and more comparative research is needed to
consider how diﬀerent types of deliberative interventions aﬀect these
processes. For example, in the study by Kenter (2016c, in this issue)
deliberation helped participants to better understand the wider role of
diﬀerent environmental components in the social-ecological system
(e.g. the role of wetlands vs woodlands), while it also brought out
competing social demands for resources such as education and
healthcare, which reduced monetary values for ecosystem services
overall but increased the portion assigned to conserving biodiversity.
Kenter et al. (2016b, in this issue) found that deliberating on narratives
brought out the deeper meanings, identities and experiences associated
with values, which led to convergence between monetary values for
marine conservation and non-monetary well-being indicators.
However, there are few other studies that have considered speciﬁc
eﬀects of these kind of interventions both in terms of deliberative
outcomes (e.g. changes in trust between participants, changes in
capacity to deliberate) and value outcomes (e.g. changes in WTP).
Questions can also be raised around the relation between value
formation and value changes, both at the individual level and in groups
in terms of convergence or divergence: in what form do values exist
before they are expressed in a valuation process, and how do diﬀerent
features of the process, such as the key factors identiﬁed by Kenter
et al. (2016a; Fig. 2) lead to diﬀerent outcomes? Fig. 3 depicts possible
ways in which values may be changed or formed, and in a social process
converge or diverge: they are preformed and may or may not be
changed through expression/deliberation (Fig. 3a); they are unformed
or poorly formed as ‘proto-values’, and formed in the process of
expression (b); they are changed or formed and also converged through
the process (c or d); they are preconverged and changed (e) or exist as
shared proto-values and formed through the process (f); the process
changes preformed values leading to value divergence (g); or proto-
values are formed but also diverged through the process (h).
While changes in contextual values are commonly reported after
deliberation, Raymond and Kenter (2016, in this issue), Kenter (2016c,
in this issue) and Kenter et al. (2016b, in this issue) provide some of
the ﬁrst empirical evidence that short-term deliberative processes can
lead to more fundamental changes in norms and transcendental values.
Whether or not these changes in values are transient, when asked in
the Kenter et al. (2016b) study, participants expressed a clear
preference for values they expressed after deliberation, i.e. reﬂecting
shifts in transcendental values, to be used in decision-making. This is
consistent with theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour
(Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980), the model of responsible environmental
behaviour (Hines et al., 1986–87; Hungerford and Volk, 1990; Sia
et al., 1985–86) and Value-Belief-Norm theory (Stern et al., 1999;
Stern, 2000), where changes in personal and social norms inform
behavioural intentions.
By integrating deliberation into a decision-making process (e.g. for
policy development), these behavioural intentions may then be re-
Fig. 2. The Deliberative Value Formation (DVF) model (Source: Kenter et al., 2016a, in this issue), proving a theoretical template of how an individual forms contextual values and
indicators through deliberation with others, the key factors that inﬂuence this process and its potential outcomes. Arrows indicate the direction of inﬂuence. Worldviews and
transcendental values, while they inﬂuence the deliberative process, are assumed to be relatively enduring and are only likely to change as a result of long-term or repeated deliberative
processes (dashed arrows).
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ﬂected in actual decisions resulting in the creation of preventative
measures or incentives to facilitate the intended behaviours formed by
those involved in the decision-making process. Following this ap-
proach, it may therefore be possible to design interventions that aﬀect
changes in communal values, drawing on an understanding of social
networks, concepts of homophily and the capacity for knowledge
brokers and boundary organisations to create bridges between hetero-
philous social groups. So far there has been little comparative
investigation between deliberative ecosystem service valuations and
these other kinds of institutional deliberations.
Over longer time horizons, Everard et al. (2016, in this issue)
suggest that social learning proceses can lead to a socialisation of shifts
in values at the scale of broader social units, communities of practice or
societies. They argue that society evolves by expansion of the ‘ethical
envelope’, which is progressively cemented into societal and cultural
values, norms and institutions when social learning leads to ‘rippling
out’, aﬀecting the development of constraining levers including regula-
tion, modiﬁcation of markets, a range of statutory and near-statutory
protocols and evolving bodies of law.
2.6. Deliberative monetary valuation
DMV can be seen as a range of approaches distributed on a
spectrum between two archetypes: Deliberated Preferences and
Deliberative Democratic Monetary Valuation (DDMV) (Kenter,
2017; Table 3). The former adapts stated preferences methods to
include information-focused deliberation to enhance individual pre-
ferences, dealing with unfamiliarity with complex goods such as
ecosystem services. In contrast, the latter applies a conception of
deliberation as a process to enable value pluralism, better integrate
transcendental values, and focus on the public rather than individual
good. Deliberated Preferences approaches conventionally elicit indivi-
dual WTP, while DDMV elicits monetary values at the societal scale
(social WTP), or fair prices at the individual scale. This issue presents
two Deliberated Preferences case studies (a choice experiment by
Kenter, 2016c and a contingent valuation study by Kenter et al.,
2016c), both involving a multi-stage DMV where the valuation moved
from non-deliberated to deliberated individual preferences, increas-
ingly moving closer to a DDMV format, where participants ultimately
voted on fair prices. A third case study (Orchard-Webb et al., 2016) was
fully implemented through DDMV, establishing social WTP through
negotiation by a group of stakeholders.
2.6.1. Deliberated preferences
Debate and empirical research on the motivations behind WTP in
stated preference approaches has suggested that WTP is often not
reﬂective of exchange values, but rather should be seen as a charitable
contribution (Kahneman and Ritov, 1994; Ryan and Spash, 2011;
Spash, 2006). These contributions may lead to higher bids than
consequentialist payments (Spash, 2006). The two Deliberated
Preferences studies in this issue (Kenter, 2016c; Kenter et al., 2016b)
suggest that a shift from individual values to shared values, in these
cases expressed as group-deliberated fair prices, not so much rejects
the ‘purchase model’ in favour of a ‘contribution model’ (Kahneman
Fig. 3. Ways in which deliberation can impact on values in terms of value formation, change, convergence (e.g. through collective learning) and divergence (e.g. through loss of trust
between actors). In diagram a, values of individuals 1 and 2 are changed as a result of deliberation but there is no value convergence or divergence between individuals. In b, values are
yet unformed or poorly formed (‘proto-values’) and are formed through deliberation, but again without con-/divergence. In c and d, deliberation results in not just value change or
formation but also convergence. In e preconverged values are collectively changed through deliberation. In f, there are some shared but poorly formed values, and deliberation helps to
form them. In g and h, deliberation leads to divergence.
Table 3
Deliberated Preferences vs Deliberative Democratic Monetary Valuation (DDMV)
(Source: Kenter, 2017).
Deliberated
Preferences
DDMV
Conception of deliberation Informing preferences
through group
discussion
Deliberating on plural
values to consider public
good
Issues the approach
addresses
Familiarity Complexity and
uncertainty
Weak value plurality Strong value plurality
Value aggregation
Means of establishing
value to society
Aggregation of
individual utility
Deliberation and
negotiation
Value concept focus Contextual and
indicators
Transcendental, contextual
and indicators
Value provider Individual in group
setting
Group
Rationality assumptions Instrumental Communicative
Conception of
representativeness
Statistical Statistical or political
Scale of value and value
indicators used
Value to individual
(individual WTP or
fair price)
Value to individual (fair
price);
Value to society
(deliberated social WTP)
WTP: Willingness to pay
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et al., 1999), but rather means a shift to what Dietz et al. (2009) calls a
‘public policy model’. Within this broader societal framing, participants
consider beneﬁts and costs alongside competing social priorities, policy
eﬀectiveness, and the process and justice related concerns and values
highlighted previously in Sections 2.2, 2.4 and 2.5, such as fairness,
equity and responsibility.
The two DMV studies by Kenter and colleagues demonstrate that
this shift can generate signiﬁcantly diﬀerent outcomes in terms of
monetary values, which in both cases decreased substantially compared
to non-deliberated individual WTP. Based on evidence from economic
models, psychometric analysis, participant discussion and feedback, it
is apparent that these shared values are more informed, considered,
conﬁdent and reﬂective of participants’ deeper-held, transcendental
values than individual non-deliberated values. In the Kenter et al.
(2016b) study, which focuses on cultural services around potential
marine protected areas, fair prices converged with non-monetary
subjective well-being values, whilst individual WTP did not.
Participants formed values in relation to speciﬁc habitats, where there
had previously only been values for marine sites in general.
Participants felt more conﬁdent in the deliberated values, which they
also felt were most suitable for informing policy-making. The study
concludes that these ﬁndings imply that deliberated shared values were
a better impression of welfare impacts than conventional individual
WTP, and suggests the possibility of harnessing group deliberation and
fair prices to reduce hypothetical bias, which remains an important
unresolved issue in stated preferences research.
Another debate that is unresolved is how value indicators that move
away from neoclassical value assumptions – deliberated WTP and
particularly fair prices - should be aggregated and used in appraisal.
For example, the legitimacy of Deliberated Preferences might be
questioned in term of their representativeness, based on the evidence
that deliberation changes values, and valuation workshop participants
thus become unrepresentative of the population they are supposed to
represent. However, it is important to realise that ex ante valuations
are always a limited impression or projection of what ex post welfare
impacts will turn out to be. As such, the question should be rephrased
as whether participants’ values post-deliberation are more or less
reﬂective of actual welfare impacts of a policy or project after it has
come about. This is, of course, impossible to answer ex ante, but
improvements in participants’ conﬁdence, the forming of more speciﬁc
values, better reﬂection of transcendental values, and convergence of
monetary and subjective well-being values suggest that this may well be
the case.
Legitimacy concerns might also reﬂect viewing deliberation as a
type of manipulation, particularly where it aims to ‘moralise’ (Lo and
Spash, 2013) preferences. However, it can also be argued that our
preferences are manipulated on a daily basis (e.g. through advertising)
and that deliberation can provide a transparent route to establishing
values that is preferable to feigned notions of consumer sovereignty
(Norton et al., 1998; Farber et al., 2002; O’Hara and Stagl, 2002). In
this issue, the Deliberative Value Formation model (Kenter et al.,
2016a) provides a theoretical and methodological framework for the
design of transparent, eﬀective and inclusive deliberative valuations,
noting that regardless of whether deliberative valuation focuses on
better informing preferences or on better recognising plural and
transcendental values to consider the public good, there will be similar
key issues to consider, e.g. relating to participants capacity to deliber-
ate, power dynamics and group composition (Fig. 2).
2.6.2. Deliberative Democratic Monetary Valuation
Democratic deﬁcits in environmental policy persist despite growing
beliefs that democratisation of valuation can secure more sustainable
and equitable decision-making (Norton et al., 1998; Farber et al., 2002;
Fish et al., 2011b; Lo and Spash, 2013; Parks and Gowdy, 2013;
Zografos and Howarth, 2010; Kenter et al., 2015; Kenter, 2016b, in this
issue; Irvine et al., 2016, in this issue; Orchard-Webb et al., 2016, in
this issue). Also, focus on the democratic content of ecosystem service
valuation methodologies has increased in the context of broader
demands for improved democratic legitimacy in mechanisms for
multiple and diverse stakeholder engagement in environmental plan-
ning and ecosystem management (Pieraccini, 2015a, 2015b; Ranger
et al., 2016, in this issue). DDMV embraces the essentially political
nature of valuation by creating an inclusive platform and mechanism
for inter-subjective group deliberation of shared communal, cultural
and societal values. DDMV seeks to negotiate fair terms for social co-
operation through group deliberation on plural values and establish
social WTP through negotiation, rather than aggregation of individual
values (Kenter, 2017). The democratic content in DDMV is secured by
a combination of procedural fairness at each stage of the process;
creating inclusive platforms for expression of transcendental and
contextual values by ‘free and equal citizens’; and creating the condi-
tions for communicative rationality via social interaction and learning
resulting from argument, reason giving, listening and respecting other
views (Lo and Spash, 2013; Kenter, 2017).
In a rare empirical examination of DDMV, Orchard-Webb et al.
(2016, in this issue) illustrate how a variety of deliberative, interpretive
and analytical techniques can be combined in a stakeholder-led process
of developing and evaluating policy, establishing deliberated group
values for diﬀerent policy options, and securing shared learning
between stakeholders, in terms of both the motivation for values
attributed to their local environment and the democratic outcome
value of the process of deliberation and dialogue. DDMV was shown to
help address DMV methodological challenges regarding inclusivity,
participation, conditions for reasoned debate, and eﬀorts to secure
mutuality and reciprocity. However, the empirical study also recog-
nised its limitations in terms of evidence of inequalities of power within
the process design and group discussions, requiring development of
further understanding and case studies regarding the identiﬁcation and
mitigation of hidden exclusions within design, recruitment, facilitation
and participation. In particular, there is a need to pursue empirical
work to develop and test a range of DDMV protocols that are defensible
in terms of deliberative democracy theory. Just as Habermas (1984)
developed a dynamic critical reﬂexive test for the application of
communicative rationality, there is a need to employ protocols that
act as a check on imbalances and technologies of power in the
operationalizing of DDMV.
For example, one such protocol might raise questions around the
conditions needed for more inclusive or expansive interpretations of
deliberation (beyond formal reasoned argument) that better reﬂect the
wide range of approaches citizens feel most comfortable using to
communicate and persuade others of their values or goals (see
Young, 1996). Other protocols might relate to enabling community
co-design; just representation and group composition; and the balance
of techniques needed for expressing diﬀerent local knowledges. Using
deliberative democratic theory to inform these protocols will help
address concerns regarding the democratic legitimacy of ﬁndings, as
well as helping secure more sustainable and just decision-making in
environmental policy and planning.
Another key question is how DDMV may be able to represent the
interests of those who are unable to represent themselves at the table,
including non-humans and future generations. Stated and Deliberated
Preferences valuation approaches can elicit bequest and existence
values, but these are ultimately still grounded in assumptions of self-
regarding utility. In theory, DDMV is inclusive of plural values without
such ethical restrictions, but there is currently no evidence thay DDMV
can genuinely improve representation of plural values, including
intrinsic values, compared to Deliberated Preferences approaches.
2.7. Value aggregation, meta-values and ‘rules of the game’
The formidable challenges of collective decision making have been
well-recognised since at least Plato (Christiano, 2015). Whenever
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proposals aﬀect multiple individuals with heterogeneous knowledge,
incentives and preferences, those preferences must somehow be
elicited and aggregated to arrive at a collective decision. Arrow
(1950) formalised the impossibility of aggregating individual rankings
while satisfying certain basic desirable criteria (e.g. non-dictatorship).
Valuation methods often go beyond rankings and seek to elicit the
intensity of preferences or values more broadly, but aggregating them
remains challenging. DDMV studies such as Orchard-Webb et al.
(2016, in this issue) can ‘aggregate by mutual consent’ (Howarth and
Wilson, 2006), while cost-beneﬁt analysis (CBA) usually applies the
Kaldor-Hicks criterion: maximise the net monetary value of willingness
to pay/accept across all individuals, regardless of rights, or distribu-
tion. Neither approach is unproblematic. While deliberation can
achieve genuine reductions in disagreement, ‘mutual consent’ can also
reﬂect inequalities of knowledge, capability and power (Kenter et al.,
2016a, in this issue; Orchard-Webb et al. 2016, in this issue; Lo, 2013),
and deliberation becomes more challenging (though not necessarily
impossible) as the number of aﬀected people increases. CBA can be
conducted at large scales, and as an analytical exercise can claim to
reduce inequalities of power between stakeholders. However, it is a
product of power relations at higher levels (e.g. who determines the
options to be valued or what discount rates are used?), and Kaldor-
Hicks (or common adjustments thereto) appears to violate common
intuitions about how aggregation should occur (e.g. by assuming that
winners compensate losers, such that policies are win–wins and the
marginal utility of money is therefore irrelevant; Hockley, 2014).
People's meta-values for how aggregation should occur, what might
be called the ‘rules of the game’, are by deﬁnition transcendental shared
values: they should transcend a speciﬁc context (Kenter et al., 2015).
However, despite the long history of thought in this area, empirical
evidence on people's values and preferences for diﬀerent aggregation
approaches remains rare. We know little about how they are aﬀected by
context or culture and how much they vary between individuals
(though some evidence is provided by stylised experiments, e.g.
Griﬃn et al., 2012). We also need to understand more about how
people's transcendental values around and preferences for aggregation
rules compare to those used by diﬀerent decision-making institutions,
and how important any diﬀerences are in terms of the real-world
outcomes that result. We hypothesise diﬀerences will be greater the
more issues are complex and contested, or involve values that are
diﬃcult to monetise. Of course, such transcendental values will be
challenging to elicit, and are unlikely to be independent of the methods
used. Deliberation with others is also likely to aﬀect what meta-values
and preferences around aggreation people express, which leads to the
theoretical need for agreement on the terms of deliberation. This can in
theory lead to an inﬁnite regress, though in practice could be achieved
on the basis of established participatory principles (see Kenter et al.,
2016a, in this issue). The question of how we should aggregate
individuals’ values has received vastly less attention than procedures
for their elicitation. Thus, while the challenges noted here are formid-
able, we would expect considerable returns to careful empirical work
on these meta-values.
2.8. Integration of valuation methods
The empirical studies detailed in this Special Issue illustrate how
diﬀerent types of methods (deliberative, analytical, interpretive) can be
integrated to better incorporate complexity into valuation, work with
plural values in contested contexts and help make implicit and subtle
values explicit, taking advantage of the speciﬁc strengths of diﬀerent
methods. Fig. 4 gives an impression of our view of the relative
suitability of key methods and methodological approaches in these
terms.1 DMV (Kenter, 2016c; Kenter et al., 2016b; Orchard-Webb
et al., 2016) and multi-criteria analysis (Ranger et al., 2016) provide a
pragmatic analytical backbone to value formation and elicitation
exercises for most studies, establishing value indicators for diﬀerent
environmental beneﬁts and policy options. Visioning and participatory
systems modelling (Kenter, 2016c; Orchard-Webb et al., 2016) provide
an eﬀective means to orientate towards joint analysis, consider com-
plex linkages and consider future uncertainties. Participatory mapping
(Kenter, 2016c; Fish et al., 2016) allows a spatial consideration of often
speciﬁc and localised values that elude the more abstract monetary
valuation. Discussion of diﬀerent elements of well-being and sense of
place in relation to transcendental values using a values compass
(Kenter et al., 2016b; Orchard-Webb et al., 2016), large-scale well-
being indicators (Bryce et al., 2016) or ethnographic video interviews
following the Community Voice Methodology (Ranger et al., 2016)
allows for bringing together values and subjective experience. This can
be supported by storytelling (Kenter et al., 2016b) and arts-based
interventions (Edwards et al., 2016; Fish et al., 2016), which prove a
useful method to understand experiences that are otherwise diﬃcult to
appreciate, allowing art and stories to express the way a place can make
someone feel (Chan et al., 2012a). Bringing together narratives and
deliberation allows people to better understand what is worthwhile and
meaningful to both themselves and others, and to gain a sense of
empowerment from their voice being heard.
Diﬀerent monetary and non-monetary methods thus have diﬀerent
strengths in terms of eliciting particular kinds of values. However,
Kenter (2016b, in this issue) warns against a methodological ‘dividing
the turf’, where conventional monetary valuation and CBA deal with
with provisioning, regulating services and recreation, and non-mone-
tary approaches value cultural ecosystem services; or ‘parallel tracks’
where distinct monetary and ‘sociocultural valuation’ evidence bases
are separately built up. The paper argues that this creates an artiﬁcial
divide between monetary and non-monetary methods, equates diﬀer-
ent non-monetary methods that are widely diverse, does not deal with
institutional and axiological critiques leveraged against monetary
valuation or encourage us to be critical of each others’ assumptions
more broadly, and fails to lead to genuine inter- and transdisciplinary.
Splitting oﬀ non-monetary/sociocultural/cultural service values is in
danger of not just leading to separate value domains but also separate
knowledge domains. Without clear integration mechanisms, and in
combination with a ‘Pontius Pilates’ perspective on knowledge transfer,
researchers stay clear of weighing diﬀerent evidences, passing the
Complexity, uncertainty and contestation
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wellbeing
indicators
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Scenarios/
visioning
Participatory
mapping
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Method
Fig. 4. Methods used in empircal studies in this issue of Ecosystem Services and their
relative suitability for application in complex, uncertain and contested contexts and for
making implicit and subtle values explicit. DDMV: Deliberative Democratic Monetary
Valuation. MCA: Multi-Criteria Analysis.
1 We do not suggest that these two dimensions should be the sole criteria by which to
select which methods to use or combine for assessing shared values. Methods may, for
example, also be more or less suitable according to their resource and time demands, the
types of values they can elicit, and in relation to decision making their appropriateness
for diﬀerent stages of the policy cycle (see Kenter et al., 2014a and Kenter, 2016a for an
overview).
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burden on to decision makers. This undermines the eﬀectiveness of
valuation evidence, as addressing the major social-ecological sustain-
ability challenges of our time requires moving beyond a naive
technical-rational model of knowledge utilisation to enable transdisci-
plinary integration of knowledge (Haines-Young and Potschin, 2014;
Rivera-Ferre et al., 2013; Edwards et al., 2016, in this issue; Kenter,
2016b, in this issue).
While the the case studies in this issue have not resolved these
issues perfectly, they provide examples of working closely with decision
makers in integrating diﬀerent knowledges and values through delib-
eration and of using deliberative models for weighing up diﬀerent
dimensions of value based on interdisciplinary conceptual frameworks.
However, a better understanding is needed of how diﬀerent elements of
shared values approaches should be integrated to suit diﬀerent
contexts and objectives, and how diﬀerent combinations of methods
aﬀect procedural and substantive outcomes. Such questions can also be
linked to those concerning the temporal eﬀects of deliberation as well
as the role of such methods in processes of conﬂict and decision
making. Integrating methods will be a key part of elucidating the
process of deliberation and further developing and testing the
Deliberative Value Formation model. For example, integrated methods
are necessary to elucidate how diﬀerent types of values are expressed
and how these are adapted or developed through deliberation com-
pared to instrumental analytical approaches (Raymond et al., 2014).
Such methods integration and comparison may allow important
questions to be answered such as how and to what extent diﬀerent
analytical, interpretive and deliberative valuation methods privilege or
undermine the values of diﬀerent social or cultural groups, e.g. in terms
of social class, education, and non-indigenous vs indigenous groups. A
key challenge is to deﬁne sets of methods that situate local or margin-
alised values and knowledges in such a way that they can be fully
articulated, but which can also be taken forward as evidence for
broader decision-making processes.
3. Conclusions
Shared, plural and cultural values of ecosystems constitute a diﬀuse
and interdisciplinary ﬁeld of research, covering an area that links
questions around value ontology, elicitation and aggregation with
questions of participation, ethics, and social justice. We have presented
future directions for further research around a broad range of areas
relating to shared values, with particular attention to deliberation as a
means both for formation of shared values, and also to integrate
diﬀerent types of knowledge and values. Notably, contributions in this
Special Issue develop a wide range of key themes that have been
highlighted by IPBES as crucial in recognition of the plural nature of
values (Box 1), such as the importance of culture and institutions, the
relationality of values, and participatory means of integrating values in
decisions. Box 1 also highlights a number of ways that the work in this
issue can extend on and help operationalise the IPBES values frame-
work and help address some of its current gaps, such as in relation to
mechanisms for integration of plural values and in terms of the crucial
understanding that values are often poorly formed, requiring a process
of value formation, rather than just elicitation.
The conception of shared values as the values that we come to
express and assign through our interactions with others raises funda-
mental questions on the nature of the contextual values that we
express: whether we hold single or multiple sets of values, partially
formed ‘proto-values’, or simply do not hold values and only form them
through expression and interaction. This has implications for how we
understand valuation and gives rise to the need for a diﬀerent valuation
language. For example, if contextual values are not held separately
from processes of elicitation, valuation becomes a process of value
formation and expression, rather than of capturing values.
Irrespective of whether values are held or formed through expres-
sion, the ethical, moral and justice dimensions of many environmental
issues necessitate approaches that allow for the elicitation of shared,
plural and cultural values, particularly in contexts that are complex or
contested. While not limited to cultural ecosystem services, these issues
come to the fore more often than not in relation to cultural aspects of
ecosystems such as spiritual and aesthetic values. Here values are often
expressed in ways that are intersubjective, evolve through social
processes and reﬂect two-way relationships between people and nature,
resisting talk of consequentialist beneﬁts.
Catalyst and conﬂict points can play a key role in the emergence and
articulation of values at a societal or community level that have not
previously been outwardly or explicitly articulated. Catalyst and con-
ﬂict points can be symbolic and are often linked to wider contested
issues and meanings about who is involved in decision-making, whose
voice counts and who receives the beneﬁts or disbeneﬁts of environ-
mental change. By recognising transcendental societal and communal
values (the deeper-held and overarching values held by society and
communities), it becomes possible to make these values explicit and
incorporate them in decision-making to better anticipate and manage
conﬂicts.
An integrated mixed method approach is required to elicit the
multiple dimensions of shared values and to translate transcendental
values into contextual values and value indicators. Monetary valuation
is limited to quantifying values. Other methods are needed to under-
stand their meaning or content, and the communal, societal and
transcendental values that underpin them. Psychometric, non-analy-
tical and interpretive methods such as artistic methods or storytelling
can reveal those shared values. They can be combined with analytical-
deliberative methods (e.g. DMV and multi-criteria analysis) to provide
a comprehensive valuation that can quantify values, understand their
individual and shared meanings and signiﬁcance, and better include
ethical dimensions. More research is needed on how diﬀerent method
integrations generate diﬀerent procedural and substantive outcomes,
whether diverse approaches with sometimes conﬂicting theoretical
assumptions in terms of epistemologies and value ontologies can be
bridged, and where there are hidden issues of power and exclusion in
terms of which methods are chosen and how they are implemented.
Direct involvement of practitioners and decision-makers in a number
of studies in this issue (Kenter, 2016c; Orchard-Webb et al., 2016;
Ranger et al., 2016; Edwards et al., 2016) demonstrates how mixed
method valuations integrated through deliberative processes can
become a boundary object between research and decision makers.
Investigation of how these new democratic spaces can function in
terms of more eﬀective translation of values into policy and practice is
crucial for enabling the transformative potential of valuations.
Shared values resulting from deliberative, group-based valuation
are diﬀerent from individual values. Empirical evidence presented this
issue (Kenter, 2016c; Kenter et al., 2016b) suggests that they are more
informed, considered, conﬁdent and reﬂective of participants’ deeper-
held, transcendental values. Deliberated, group-based monetary values
may be a better reﬂection of real welfare impacts than non-deliberated
individual values, if derived through a carefully designed and managed
process, and research is needed to further explore how, and the degree
to which deliberation can enhance participants' ability to value the
implications of counterfactual futures and reduce hypothetical bias.
As a socially-mediated learning process, deliberative value forma-
tion is inﬂuenced by a set of key factors such as timescale and depth of
interactions, the diversity of perspectives brought by diﬀerent partici-
pants to the deliberation, the quality of facilitation and process design,
the management of power dynamics within the deliberation and the
degree to which transcendental values are made explicit. While it is
generally assumed that transcendental values do not change in the
short term, empirical evidence from psychometric testing indicates that
carefully designed, short-term deliberative processes can lead to
changes in both contextual and transcendental value expression
(Raymond and Kenter, 2016, in this issue), though further research
is needed to investigate whether and when these value changes are
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transient or lasting. Whether or not this is the case, if participants state
clear preferences for values they expressed after deliberation (i.e.
reﬂecting this shift in contextual and transcendental values) to be used
in decision-making, this suggests that valuations that integrate delib-
eration have the capacity to draw on more salient knowledge that is
perceived to be more legitimate, and less likely to be contested. It also
highlights the importance of attending to transcendental values, which
have thus far largely been ignored in both monetary and non-monetary
valuation of ecosystem services.
However, deliberative valuation methods such as DMV raise
important questions around the legitimacy of deliberation processes.
From a conventional economic perspective, in Deliberated Preferences
approaches these are likely to focus on issues such as representation
and consumer sovereignty. In contrast, DDMV bases its legitimacy on
deliberative democratic theory that posits ideals of communicative
rationality, which are very diﬃcult to fully achieve in practice. This is in
particular because there is an intrinsic tension between on the one
hand recognising participants’ freedom to deliberate on their terms
without external interference, and on the other hand the need for
enabling and equalising mechanisms through process design, capacity
building exercises and active facilitation. DDMV, while promising in
terms of creating conditions for inclusivity, value plurality, reasoned
debate, mutuality and reciprocity, thus has key challenges in terms of
identiﬁcation and mitigation of hidden exclusions within design,
recruitment, participation and facilitation.
Deliberation also opens up avenues to deliberate on meta-values,
transcendental values around how to aggregate values. Within main-
stream economics, diﬃculties associated with aggregating values, such
as in CBA, have long been recognised, but have also been neglected
(Hockley, 2014; Kenter et al., 2015; Parks and Gowdy, 2013). There is
also little empirical evidence on what people think the ‘rules of the
game’ should be in relation to aggregation. Deliberative avenues for
aggregation by mutual consent have their own practical and theoretical
challenges, with only few examples in practice especially at larger
scales, providing an interesting avenue of exploration for future
research.
In conclusion, we have presented 35 research questions to help give
direction to future ecosystem services valuation research, and more
broadly valuation in complex and contested contexts where plural,
subtle and conﬂicting values come into play. Ultimately, the purpose of
ecosystem service valuation is to ensure that we recognise the
tremendous importance of ecosystems for human economies, societies
and cultures. Crucially, valuations cannot be separated from these
social, cultural and institutional contexts (O’Hara and Stagl, 2002;
Vatn, 2009). In this sense any valuation is ‘social’, whether this is
recognised by those conducting it or not. The discourse on shared,
plural and cultural values and deliberative valuation presented here
provides directions to help embed these social aspects in a more
transparent and rigorous way. Shared values approaches are crucial in
realising the transformative potential of valuation by enhancing
democratic participation, integrating knowledge, generating social
learning and providing deliberative platforms that directly engage
policy makers and practitioners. Further study is needed to demon-
strate a more extensive evidence base to mature these approaches, and
develop valuation into a more pluralistic, comprehensive, legitimate
and eﬀective way of safeguarding ecosystems and their services for the
future.
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Box 1. Shared values and values in IPBES
The conceptualisation and operationalisation of shared values in this issue can contribute to the understanding of values by IPBES (as discussed
by Díaz et al., 2015), both by enrichment and exempliﬁcation in areas of existing overlaps, and by helping to address various unresolved issues.
In terms of the ﬁrst, IPBES recognises the importance of transcendental values as our principles and life goals, and as important determinants
underlying our contextual values (cf. in this issue Raymond and Kenter, 2016). There is also an understanding of the importance of culturally
speciﬁc socialisation in shaping these values, and the important role of formal and informal institutions in forming and expressing these values
(cf. in this issue Everard et al., 2016). There is explicit recognition of the role of speciﬁc local knowledge (cf. in this issue Ranger et al., 2016),
practices (cf. in this issue Fish et al., 2016a and Edwards et al., 2016), and places (cf. in this issue Fish et al., 2016b and Kenter, 2016c) in
generating and validating values. There is emphasis on relational values as distinct from instrumental and intrinsic values (cf. in this issue
Cooper et al., 2016; Bryce et al., 2016 and Fish et al., 2016a). There is much attention to inclusivity in terms of diﬀerent languages and ways of
expressing values and knowledge (cf. in this issue Orchard-Webb et al., 2016; Kenter et al., 2016b and Edwards et al., 2016). More broadly,
IPBES emphasizes the importance of participation, and this issue has demonstrated a wide range of deliberative and participatory approaches
throughout.
There are also some important ways through which the emerging theory and methods around shared values can expand IPBES value
understandings. First, Díaz et al. (2015) give little attention to the process of value formation, with values implicitly described as ‘out there’ to be
captured. In contrast, an important thread throughout this Special Issue is the understanding and empirical demonstration that values,
particularly around complex and often contested goods such as ecosystems, are formed through processes of valuation, and thus that there is a
need to clearly understand and conceptualise how such value formation processes take place (Kenter et al., 2016a; Irvine et al., 2016). Second, a
shared values approach to valuation is explicit in its recognition not just of the need to consider plural knowledges and values, as is emphasised
by IPBES, but also how these are integrated and relate to and can inﬂuence decision-making contexts. In particular, we argue that deliberative
valuations have signiﬁcant promise as integrative boundary objects (Kenter, 2016c) and new democratic spaces (Irvine et al., 2016), where
transdisciplinary processes with direct involvement of decision-makers integrate multiple knowledges and plural values into policy formation
and evaluation (with examples by Orchard-Webb et al., 2016; Ranger et al., 2016; Edwards et al., 2016; Kenter, 2016c). Finally, we highlight in
this paper the need to consider people's meta-values around how these processes should take place, and that understanding and negotiating
meta-values can help inform how these new democratic spaces should be shaped and how conﬂicts between multiple evidence-bases and
incommensurable dimensions of value should be resolved. Thus, shared values approaches can provide a rich contribution to key aspects of
plural valuation as conceived of by IPBES, and help expand these conceptions and operationalise them through novel theory and methods.
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